The principle of good faith is one of the fundamental foundations of Ukraine's legal system. Its significance is enshrined, in particular, in Article 3 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, which recognizes good faith as one of the general principles of civil law. Good faith is understood as a standard of lawful conduct characterized by honesty, transparency, reasonableness, and respect for the rights and legitimate interests of other participants in legal relations. One of the key manifestations of this principle is the prohibition on the abuse of rights in the exercise of subjective rights and procedural powers.
Abuse of procedural rights should be understood as intentional bad-faith actions by participants in judicial proceedings aimed at restricting the exercise of procedural rights by other participants, creating obstacles to the administration of justice, or groundlessly prolonging the examination of a case.
At the same time, a clear distinction must be drawn between the abuse of substantive (civil) rights and the abuse of procedural rights, as each of these violations gives rise to different legal consequences. In particular, where a court establishes a fact of abuse of procedural rights, it is entitled to leave an application, complaint, motion, or claim without consideration, or to return it, and may also apply other measures of procedural compulsion depending on the nature of the violation.
A natural question arises, however: do courts always respond appropriately to instances of abuse of procedural rights?
Practice shows that the answer is no. This is due primarily to the fact that a significant number of abuses outwardly appear to be the legitimate exercise by a party of the procedural rights afforded by law. For this reason, drawing the line between the good-faith exercise of procedural rights and their abuse frequently proves difficult.
The most common forms of such abuse include:
- filing a manifestly groundless recusal motion against a judge for the purpose of delaying or obstructing the examination of a case;
- filing a manifestly groundless or artificially constructed claim;
- the unjustified consolidation of claims or the groundless joinder of a co-defendant for the purpose of changing the rules of jurisdiction;
- the repeated filing of motions, applications, or complaints on matters already decided by the court, using new arguments or references to case law that is not actually relevant.
In practice, however, there are also clear-cut instances of abuse of procedural rights that require an appropriate procedural response from the court. These include, in particular:
- submitting to the court documents confirming payment of court fees that have already been used in other proceedings;
- withdrawing a claim after the parties have performed the terms of a settlement agreement;
- the repeated and groundless submission of applications for the approval of a settlement agreement at various stages of the proceedings;
- deliberate evasion of service of procedural documents, or failure to notify the court of a change of residential address or location during the examination of a case;
- the use of obscene language or statements that demean the honor, dignity, or business reputation of other participants in the proceedings, whether in procedural documents or during court hearings.
The examples cited demonstrate that each possible instance of abuse of procedural rights requires individual assessment. For an appropriate procedural response, the court must examine all the circumstances of the case and give them the corresponding legal evaluation. At the same time, the heavy caseload on courts — particularly courts of first instance — frequently means that individual manifestations of bad-faith procedural conduct effectively escape proper judicial attention.
This problem is not new, and its continuing relevance is confirmed by the outcomes of a professional discussion entitled "Abuse of Rights: Substance, Forms, and Means of Counteraction," held in June 2025 with the participation of Supreme Court judges.
Judges of the Supreme Court sitting as the Civil Cassation Court noted that such conduct was previously referred to as "procedural sabotage." In their view, it is becoming increasingly difficult to define the boundary between the permissible exercise of procedural rights and their abuse. The difficulty for first-instance judges in responding to instances of abuse of procedural rights lies in the fact that, on one hand, there is a risk of the relevant procedural decisions being overturned by the appellate court, while on the other, there is the possibility of numerous disciplinary complaints being filed with the High Council of Justice. Even where such complaints do not result in the opening of disciplinary proceedings, judges are compelled to spend considerable time preparing explanatory responses — which also affects their willingness to actively apply procedural sanctions.
A judge of the Supreme Court sitting as the Commercial Cassation Court emphasized that manifestations of abuse of procedural rights are characteristic not only of Ukraine but of the legal systems of other states as well. Courts should therefore not shy away from applying the mechanisms provided by law to counter such phenomena. At the same time, an important role in identifying instances of abuse must also be played by other participants in the proceedings — lawyers, prosecutors, and parties' representatives.
A judge of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court stressed that the court not only has the right but is obliged to respond to instances of abuse of procedural rights. In this connection, attention was drawn to current practice of the European Court of Human Rights, which supports the active application by courts of mechanisms to counter bad-faith procedural conduct.
During 2025, the Supreme Court formulated a number of important legal conclusions regarding the application of procedural mechanisms to counter the abuse of procedural rights.
In its ruling of February 20, 2025 in case No. 910/2262/24, the Supreme Court sitting as a panel of judges of the Commercial Cassation Court noted that the provisions of the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine contain no legislative criteria for identifying an artificial or manifestly groundless claim. Establishing such a fact is therefore only possible following a comprehensive examination of all the circumstances of the case in their entirety.
In its ruling of June 12, 2025 in case No. 924/232/22, the Supreme Court concluded that an application by a related creditor to open insolvency proceedings without any genuine aim of protecting violated rights — where the relevant circumstances have been established by the court — constitutes an abuse of procedural rights and provides grounds for leaving the application without consideration pursuant to Part 3 of Article 43 of the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine.
The Supreme Court sitting as the Administrative Cassation Court, in its ruling of May 30, 2025 in case No. 380/22793/23, formulated the criteria for applying measures of procedural compulsion for abuse of procedural rights. The Court stated that the application of the relevant sanctions requires the establishment of a combination of the following indicators: the presence of an intent to obstruct the administration of justice; the bad-faith nature of the conduct; the absence of any objective necessity for the procedural action in question; and adverse consequences for the proceedings in the form of delay, the creation of procedural confusion, or obstruction of the exercise of procedural rights by other participants.
The analysis of current judicial practice thus demonstrates that the Supreme Court is developing a consistent approach to countering the abuse of procedural rights. The significant increase in the number of legal positions on this issue during 2025–2026 reflects the courts' awareness of the scale of the problem and the need to strike a balance between the exercise of the right to judicial protection and the prevention of bad-faith procedural conduct. This trend is a positive development both for the evolution of judicial practice and for improving the effectiveness of the administration of justice in Ukraine.
